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ACTION SPEAKS LOUDER THAN FORM:  
THE CASE FOR PROTECTING ORAL COMPLAINTS UNDER THE FLSA 
CAROLINE B. PARK 
“We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade  
but with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full  
measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.”1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A.  Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics2  
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation manufactures a variety of high-
performance polymer products.3  Kevin Kasten worked there for about three years as an hourly 
manufacturing and production worker.4  Saint-Gobain required manufacturing and production 
workers—including Mr. Kasten—to don protective gear, sanitize their hands, and clean their 
shoes before going to their workstations.5  The location of the time clocks meant that workers 
clocked in after donning the required gear, and clocked out before doffing the gear.  Employees 
like Mr. Kasten were not compensated for the time it took to don and doff.   
Saint-Gobain had a Code of Ethics requiring employees to report, “known or suspected 
violations of the Code or any applicable law.”6  Saint-Gobain had an Employee Policy 
Handbook that “encouraged employees to report complaints to their supervisors and to th
Human Resources Manager if the matter was not resolved.”
e 
                                                
7   Following this protocol, Mr. 
Kasten complained orally to several supervisors about the location of the time clocks, and his 
 
1 Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123–124 (3rd Cir. 1987).   
2 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009). 
3 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F.Supp.2d 608, 609 (W.D. Wis. 2008).   
4 Id.  
5 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, No, 08-2820 (7th Cir. Oct. 6, 2008).  
6 Id. at 3.   
7 Id.  
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belief that the locations of the time clocks were illegal.8  Saint-Gobain terminated Mr. Kasten in 
December of 2006.   
                                                
Kasten filed suit, alleging that his complaints were protected activity and that he was 
improperly terminated in violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (“FLSA”),9 which guards employees who engage in protected activity from reprisal.  The 
district court granted summary judgment for Saint-Gobain, finding that Mr. Kasten was not 
protected from retaliation because his oral complaint was not protected activity.10 
The location of the time clocks was illegal.11  Mr. Kasten complained about a legitimate 
violation, followed the employee handbook to the letter, and yet was still terminated.  There is no 
doubt that this scenario is concerning.  This paper will argue that employees like Mr. Kasten 
should have a remedy under the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The 
form the complaint takes should not be the dispositive factor in the analysis of a retaliation 
claim.  Any discharge following an employee’s sufficient assertion of statutory rights is 
discriminatory and in violation of § 215(3)(a).   
The circuit courts are split over the interpretation of § 215(3)(a), and the Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari of the Kasten case to decide if the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, 
which prohibits firing an employee because he has “filed any complaint,” requires a written 
complaint.12  Kasten declared that those circuits that had protected oral complaints were not 
 
8 Defendant Saint-Gobain denied that Mr. Kasten made these complaints.  Defendant moved for summary judgment, 
so the facts were taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Kasten.  
9 29 U.S.C.  §§ 201–219 (2006).   
10 Kasten, 619 F.Supp.2d at 611.   
11 Mr. Kasten’s case was originally consolidated with a FLSA collective action brought by other Saint-Gobain 
employees seeking compensation for time spent donning and doffing.  Mr. Kasten’s action was severed.  The district 
court granted partial summary judgment to the collective action, finding that their donning and doffing time was 
compensable.  See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F.Supp.2d 941, 955–56 (W.D. Wis. 
2008). 
12 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009), cert granted (U.S. March 22, 
2010) (No. 08-2820).     
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useful, because their holdings did “not specifically state whether the complaint in question was 
written or purely verbal, and none discuss[ed] the statute’s use of the verb to ‘to file’ and 
whether it requires a writing.”13  This Note will argue that the decisions Kasten criticized have 
embraced the most suitable interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision.  Those circuits 
evaluated the complaints in question based on their substance and sufficiency and not their form.  
This approach is the one best suited to fulfilling the purposes of the anti-retaliation provision, 
and it is this author’s hope that the Supreme Court will reverse the Seventh Circuit’s troubling 
decision.   
Part I.B of this paper will give background information on the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), and Part I.C will address retaliation provisions and a prima facie case of retaliation.  
Part II identifies the recurring arguments courts use in assessing claims under § 215(a)(3).  Part 
II.A addresses the arguments under the related issue of the protection of internal complaints.  
Part II.B focuses on the arguments made regarding informal complaints specifically.  Part III 
uses the traditional tools courts use to construe statutes to argue that the correct interpretation is 
one that protects informal complaints.  Finally, Part IV proposes the standard that courts should 
apply when considering an informal complaint.   
B.  The Fair Labor Standards Act  
The FLSA was enacted in 1938, largely in response to the Great Depression when “the 
scarcity of jobs was perceived as an invitation to wage abuses by employers. . . .”14  The purpose 
of the FLSA when enacted was to improve “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of 
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
                                                 
13 Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840.   
14 JOSEPH E. KALET, PRIMER ON FLSA & OTHER WAGE & HOUR LAWS 3 (1994).   
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workers.”15  Congress hoped the legislation would guarantee a fair minimum wage and 
reasonable working hours in industries in which workers likely had unequal bargaining power.16 
 The primary obligations of employers under the Act are in the areas of minimum wage, 
overtime pay, and child labor.17  Section 206 establishes a minimum wage owed to employees 
covered by the Act.18  The Act also regulates the workweek by requiring compensation of one 
and one-half times the regular rate for a workweek longer than 40 hours.19  
 There are—of course—enforcement mechanisms in place.  To ensure compliance with 
these regulations, Congress “chose to rely on information and complaints received from 
employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied.”20  The anti-retaliation 
provision of the Act facilitates enforcement by declaring it unlawful to retaliate against an 
employee for filing a complaint, instituting a proceeding, or testifying regarding a violation of 
the minimum wage, overtime, or other provisions of the FLSA.21  By offering protection, “[t]he 
anti-retaliation provision facilitates the enforcement of the FLSA’s standards by fostering an 
environment in which employees’ ‘fear of economic retaliation’ will not cause them ‘quietly to 
accept substandard conditions.’”22  
To further these obligations, the FLSA offers remedies for violations of the regulations.  
Section 216 lays out the penalties available for those who willfully violate the provisions of § 
                                                 
15 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).   
16 Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings Before the Senate 
Committee on Education and Labor, and House Committee on Labor, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 177 (1938).   
17 JOSEPH E. KALET, supra note 13, at 3.  
18 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).   
19 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006).   
20 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).   
21 Section 215(a)(3) of the FLSA provides, in relevant part: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee 
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding 
under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding[.]  
29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3) (2006).   
22 Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292).  See also 
Jennifer Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 539 (2001).     
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215.  An employee may file suit in court, or the Secretary of Labor may file suit on an 
employee’s behalf.23  An employer who violates § 215(a)(3) can be liable for legal or equitable 
relief, “including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of 
wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”24 
C.  Retaliation in General  
 1.  Retaliation Provisions  
Virtually all federal anti-discrimination statutes have anti-retaliation provisions that 
protect employees who complain about their employers’ practices.25  The anti-retaliation 
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, however, is slightly different from the provisions in 
other statues, as it does not contain a specific “opposition” clause.26  Courts and commentators 
often use other retaliation provisions to bolster their arguments on how the FLSA’s provision 
should or should not be interpreted.  This technique will be further discussed in Part III.E.1.   
 2.  Prima Facie Case of Retaliation  
Courts apply the shifting burden of proof scheme, initially articulated in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green.27  A prima facie case of retaliation under the FLSA requires a 
demonstration by the employee of the following: (1) he or she engaged in activity protected 
under the Act; (2) he or she subsequently suffered an adverse employment action by the 
                                                 
23 29 U.S.C. §216(b-c) (2006). 
24 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (2006).  
25 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §12203 (2006); Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §623 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3 (2006); Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§793, 794 (2006); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 
§1140 (2006); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§215(a), 216(b) (2006); Family Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §2614(a) (2006); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §948(a) 
(2006); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §1855 (2006); National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §158 (2006), Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §660(c) 
(2006); Railroad Employers Act, 45 U.S.C. §60 (2006).  
26 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting employer retaliation because an employee has “opposed any 
practice made unlawful by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or heading under this subchapter”).  
27 413 U.S. 792 (1973).  See, e.g., Richmond v. ONEOK Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 208–09 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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employer; and (3) a causal connection existed between the employee’s activity and the adverse 
action.  Successfully establishing a prima facie case of retaliation creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the employer unlawfully retaliated against the employee.28   
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of productions then shifts to the 
employer to offer a legitimate reason for the plaintiff’s termination.29  If the employer articulates 
a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged conduct, the presumption of retaliation 
established by the prima facie showing “drops out of the picture.”30  In order to survive summary 
judgment at this stage, the employee must offer evidence tending to show that the employer’s 
proffered reason is pretextual.31  This Note analyzes the first element of the prima facie case—
that the employee engaged in activity protected by the FLSA.  
II.  THE RECURRING THEMES IN THE DEBATE OVER § 215(A)(3) 
The language of § 215(a)(3) is subject to varying interpretations. Section 215(a)(3) of the 
FLSA provides, in relevant part: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any 
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or 
related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such 
proceeding[.]32      
Circuit courts differ in their willingness to read the provision broadly, which has resulted in 
disparate levels of protection afforded to employees. The courts essentially “dispute the degree 
of formality with which an employee complaint must be made in order for the employee to gain 
protection under the statute.”33  The first split in the courts is over the protection of complaints 
made directly to one’s employer.  Some circuits require a formal complaint with the Department 
                                                 
28 St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–08 (1993).   
29 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973); St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 506–08.   
30 St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 511. 
31 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 793 (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)).   
32 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)(2006).   
33 Jennifer Clemons, supra note 21, at 536.   
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of Labor,34 while other circuits protect internal complaints.  Part II.A will address the circuit split 
over internal complaints.  Though a clear majority of circuits protect internal complaints, there is 
a wide discrepancy in the way courts have approached them.  There are recurring themes that 
reappear in the arguments for and against the protection of informal complaints.  Part II.B will 
identify the types of arguments and tests employed by the courts. 
A.  Internal Complaints as distinguished from External Complaints 
The first obstacle to the interpretation of § 215(a)(3) is to determine if the language of the 
provision protects complaints made directly to an employer, instead of filed with the Department 
of Labor or in court.  A majority of appellate courts have construed the language of the provision 
to protect complaints made directly to management, so called “internal” complaints.35  Courts 
have engaged in a detailed statutory analysis to reach their conclusions on the matter.  
 1.  Internal Complaints Protected  
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that in order for the anti-retaliation provision to serve its 
purpose, “it must protect employees who complain about violations to their employers, as well as 
                                                 
34 Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 54–55 (2d Cir. 1993); Whitten v. City of Easley, 62 Fed. Appx. 477  
(4th Cir. 2003).  
35 See Kasten v. Saint Gobain Performance Plastics 570 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2009), cert granted (U.S. March 22, 
2010) (No. 08-2820) (concluding that “the plain language of § 215(a)(3) includes internal complaints as protected 
activity).  See also  Hagan v. Echostar, 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008) (allowing an internal complaint to 
constitute protected activity under § 215(a)(3)); Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 2004) (protecting an 
employee who protested his unequal pay to his supervisor); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 
1999) (holding that the anti-retaliation provision must protect employees who complain about violations to their 
employers to achieve the purposes of the FLSA); Valerio v. Putnam Assoc. Inc. 173 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(concluding “that the animating spirit of the Act is best served by a construction of § 215(a)(3) under which the 
filing of a relevant complaint with the employer no less than with a court or agency may give rise to a retaliation 
complaint”); EEOC v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992) (protecting an employee who 
complained to her employer about her pay); EEOC v. White & Son Enter. 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(finding that complaints expressed to an employer about unequal pay constitutes an assertion of rights protected 
under the FLSA); Love v. RE/MAX, 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that the FLSA applies to the 
assertion of rights through complaints at work); Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(protecting an employee for complaining to employer about returning back wages).  But see Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-
Q Co. Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that the FLSA does not prohibit retaliation “for an 
employee’s voicing of a position on working conditions in opposition to an employer”); Lambert v. Genesee 
Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2nd Cir. 1993) (“The plain language of this provision limits the cause of action to 
retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or testifying but does not encompass complaints 
made to a supervisor.”). 
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employees who turn to the Labor Department of the courts for a remedy.”36  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court parsed the language of § 215(a)(3).  First, the court reasoned that the 
sweeping implication of “file any complaint” means that the provision extends to complaints 
made to employers.37   
 The court then went on to address the implications of the verb “file.”  The court found 
support for its contention that “file” includes the filing of complaints with employers based on 
common workplace practices.  The court found it reasonable to assume that Congress drafted this 
language with knowledge of the common practice, both in union and non-union workplaces, of 
requiring employees to “file” grievances with their union or employer before pursuing any 
further proceedings.38   
 The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the plain language of § 215(a)(3) includes 
internal complaints as protected activity.39  For this court, the convincing argument centered on 
the word “any” modifying “complaint.”40  The statute does not otherwise limit the types of 
complaints, “[t]hus, the language of the statute would seem to include internal, intra-company 
complaints as protected activity.”41 
 2.  External Complaints Required  
While a clear majority of courts protect internal complaints,42 the Second and Fourth 
Circuits interpret the anti-retaliation provision strictly, and require a formal, external 
complaint.43  In Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, the Second Circuit based its reasoning on the anti-
                                                 
36 Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1998).   
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
39 Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. 
42 See supra note 34 (cataloguing cases protecting internal complaints).   
43 See Whitten v. City of Easley, 62 Fed. Appx. 477, 480–481 (4th Cir. 2003); Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Company, 
Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000); Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2nd Cir. 1993).   
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retaliation provision of Title VII.44  Title VII has a broader provision, protecting those who 
“oppose any practice.”45  The Second Circuit inferred that since the FLSA provision does
have an opposition clause, it was not written to protect employees who make informal 
complaints. The court based its reasoning on the plain language of the statute.  It found that the
anti-retaliation provision explicitly laid out three protected types of behavior (filing a complain









46  Though it noted that a number of circuits had held to the contrary, the Second 
Circuit found that the plain language of the statute left 
The Fourth Circuit agreed, finding that it would be “unfaithful to the language of the . . . 
FLSA’s anti-retaliation provisions . . . to expand its applicability to intra-company 
complaints.”48  It held in 2003 that a firefighter who complained to management could not prov
a prima facie case of retaliation because the anti-retaliation provisions did not extend to internal 
complaints.49 
 Debate Over Informal Complaints  
If internal complaints are protected, the next issue the courts had to address is how formal 
an employee’s complaint must be to warrant protection.  Before Kasten, no appellate court that 
had recognized internal complaints covered under the anti-retaliation provision had held that oral
                                                 
44 Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d at 55.  In response to this, the Ninth Circuit refused to use Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision as a basis for interpreting the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA.   The Ninth Circuit pointed to the 
differences in statutory drafting in 1938, when the FLSA was drafted, and in 1964, when Title VII was drafted.  “In 
ngress’ choice of words in 1964 can resolve the meaning of words chosen in 1937. 
see, 10 F.3d at 55 (citing EEOC v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1992)(Suhrheinrich, 
issenting in part)).   
short, we find the view. . . that Co
. . to be unpersuasive.”  Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1005.   
45 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (2006). 
46 Gene
J. concurring in part and d
47 Id.  
48 Ball, 228 F.3d at 364.  
49 Whitten, 62 Fed.Appx. at 480.  
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complaints are not protected.50  Even courts that agree that informal, internal complaints sho
be protected have used myriad arguments to arrive at the same conclusion. 
uld 
 Parts II.B.1 and 
II.B.2 will address the dominant themes in the circuit courts’ reasonings.   
 1.  Thematic Analysis Against the Protection of Oral Complaints  
 The circuits refusing to protect informal complaints are the same as those requiring 
external complaints, with the addition of the Seventh Circuit, as per its holding in Kasten.  The 
Second and Fourth Circuits have demonstrated the same strict construction in their interpreta
of both issues, which is logical and consistent.  They have refused to impute any additional 
meaning on the provision beyond what is explicitly stated in the statute.  The Seventh Circuit has 
taken a different approach, and is the only one to have done so.  The Seventh Circuit was willin
to “read into” the provision the protection of internal complaints, but not the protection of oral 
complaints.  This section will categorize and analyze the rationales typica
tion 
g 
lly employed by the 
 
such as a paper or record, to deliver to someone who can put it in its proper place.”53  Based on 
                                                
courts finding that oral or informal complaints should not be protected.   
  a.  What Would Webster Do? The Dictionary as Binding Authority51  
 The courts have often turned to the dictionary in this debate.  Congress did not include 
definitions for the terms “file” and “complaint” in the anti-retaliation provision, so many courts, 
have used dictionary to define the terms.  In Kasten, for example, the district court and the Court 
of Appeals focused heavily on the definition of “file.”52  The district court reasoned that the verb 
“to file” requires a writing, because “[o]ne cannot ‘file’ an oral complaint; there is no document,
 
50 Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 14 as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (2008)(No. 08-2820). 
51 Kasten argued in his appellate brief that “Webster’s Dictionary is not controlling authority in the Seventh Circuit.” 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, No, 08-2920.  He argued that the 
court overlooked many of the other possible definitions of “file” and blindly chose one.  Id. at 12.  
52 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain, 619 F.Supp. 608, 613 (W.D. Wisc. 2008); Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839.   
53 Kasten, 619 F.Supp. at 613.  
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this finding, the district court concluded that an employee’s complaint must be documented in 
some form.54 
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiff, and the Secretary of 
Labor as amicus, argued that “to file” can mean “to submit.”  The Court rejected that definition 
and found no ambiguity at all in the term.55  Instead, the court relied on the first entry in 
Webster’s dictionary, and found that it connotes a writing.56  It found that the “natural 
understanding of the phrase ‘file any complaint’ requires the submission of some writing to an 
employer, court, or administrative body.”57 
  b.  Comparing to Title VII  
 Both the Seventh and Second Circuits have used the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII 
as a way of proving the limited nature of § 215(a)(3).58  The anti-retaliation provision of Title 
VII is broader, forbidding employers from retaliating against any employee that “has opposed 
any practice” that is unlawful under the statute.59  The Seventh Circuit used Title VII to 
demonstrate that “Congress could have, but did not, use broader language in the FLSA’s 
retaliation provision.”60  It found unquestionably that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII 
protects oral complaints, and therefore that Congress’s selection of the term “file any complaint” 
is a significant one.61  
 The other argument based on Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is that § 215(a)(3) 
enumerates three types of conduct, while Title VII does not.  Judge Suhrheinrich made that 
                                                 
54 Id.  
55 Kasten, 570 F.3d. at 839.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 For the counterveiling argument regarding dictionary definitions, see infra Part II.B.2.a. 
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).  
60 Id.  
61 Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840.  
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argument in his oft-cited dissent in EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools.62  In that case the 
employee had protested to Romeo Community Schools that by paying male and female 
custodians differently they were “breaking some kind of law.”63  Judge Suhrheinrich 
distinguished between the two anti-retaliation provisions and found that if this were a Title VII 
action, he would agree with the majority that Romeo had unlawfully retaliated.64  He refused to 
read the broad “opposition clause” of Title VII into the FLSA.   
  c.  Plain Language Analysis  
 Occasionally courts, without reference to the meaning of the words in § 215(a)(3) or Title 
VII, hold simply that the plain language of the statute bars protection of oral complaints.  The 
Second Circuit used this plain language argument to find that external complaints are required 
and informal complaints not protected.  The Second Circuit represents the narrowest construction 
of the statute.  In Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, the court refused to impute any meaning onto the 
provision beyond what is facially protected, regardless of the redundancy created as a result.65  It 
found that “[t]he plain language [of § 215(a)(3)] limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing 
formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or testifying, but does not encompass complaints 
made to a supervisor.”66 
Another example of this type of reasoning is Judge Suhrheinrich’s dissenting opinion in 
EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools.67  In addition to comparing to Title VII, he argued that the 
anti-retaliation provision has three specifically enumerated behaviors, and that “list comprises 
                                                 
62 EEOC v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1992) For more on this dissenting opinion, see infra Part 
II.B.1.c. 
63 Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d at 989.  
64 976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1992) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
65 See infra Part III.E.2 for a discussion of the consequence of redundancy in statutory interpretation.    
66 Genesee, 10 F.3d at 55.   
67 976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1992) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
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the entire scope of complaints sufficient to fall under the statute.”68  The plain language of the 
anti-retaliation provision “does not prohibit employers from taking adverse employment action, 
that is, retaliating, against employees generally.”69 
 2.  Thematic Arguments Protecting Oral Complaints  
 The circuits that have protected oral complaints, or those that have indicated that they 
will, often use a test relying on the substance of the complaint rather than the form.  Often, the 
decisions do not focus at all on the form of the complaint, instead analyzing the substance 
entirely.70  This position “protects complaints made to an employer, but restricts the type of 
complaints protected to those where the employee has made some assertion of statutory 
rights.”71  Here there is yet another split—those circuits who find ambiguity in the provision and 
engage in detailed statutory analysis, and those who find simply that a statutory assertion of 
rights triggers protection.   
                                                
  a.  The Dictionary as a Source of Ambiguity  
 In contrast to the circuits that find the language of § 215(a)(3) unambiguous, the courts in 
this category find ambiguity in the provision, and find that consulting a dictionary only 
compounds that ambiguity.  These courts “argue that the phrase is ambiguous because it is 
susceptible to many different interpretations.”72  Noting that the statute does not have definitions 
for the pertinent terms “file” and “complaint,” the courts turn to the dictionary to demonstrate the 
many definitions available.  Instead of using the dictionary to settle the matter as the courts 
 
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839–840.  
71 Jennifer Clemons, supra note 21, at 536.   
72 Jennifer Lynne Redmond, Are You Breaking Some Kind of Law?: Protecting an Employee’s Internal Complaints 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 332 (2000-2001).   
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described in Part II.B.1.a did, these courts use the dictionary as a way to show that varied 
definitions exist.  
The First Circuit, for example, found the word “complaint” especially vague.  Turning to 
the dictionary, the court found that complaint has dual meanings.  While a complaint can be an 
expression of protest, it can also be a formal allegation or charge.73  Based on these alternate 
meanings, the court noted that “[b]y failing to specify that the filing of any complaint need be 
with a court or an agency, and by using the word any, Congress left open the possibility that it 
intended complaint to relate to less formal expressions . . . conveyed to an employer.”74  The 
First Circuit then turned to the possible meanings of “file.”  The court found the definition of file 
“sufficiently elastic to encompass” informal complaints.75  
  b.  The Remedial Purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
Courts have sometimes eschewed a detailed analysis in favor of a broader policy 
argument.  The Fifth Circuit protected an informal complaint, but did not engage in detailed 
statutory analysis.  Instead, in Hagan v. Echostar, the court announced that informal complaints 
should be protected under § 215(a)(3) because “it better captures the anti-retaliation goals of that 
section.”76  However, the court articulated limitations on the informal complaints to be protected.  
The court required the complaint to concern a violation of law.77  If the employee is a manager 
voicing the concerns of his or her subordinates, the manager must step outside the role of 
manager and “make clear to the employer that the employee was taking a position adverse to the 
employer.”78  Though it recognized that the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision necessitates 
                                                 
73 Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 464 (1971)).  Note that Justice Scalia 
has objected to use of Webster’s Third, finding it too colloquial.  See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1994).   
74 Id.    
75 Id. at 42.  
76 Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008).   
77 Id. at 626.   
78 Id. at 628.   
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a broad reading, the Fifth Circuit found that the employee in Hagan did not do enough to make 
clear to her employer she was taking a position adverse to the employer.79   
 In EEOC v. White & Son, the Eleventh Circuit also used the purpose of the FLSA as the 
basis for its reasoning.  A group of female employees asked their employer why they did not 
receive raises when their male coworkers did.  Their boss told them to “take it or leave it,” so the 
women left the premises.  The court found that this was a discharge in retaliation for the 
women’s opposition to the unfair practice.  It found that a broad construction of the provision 
would best further the purpose of preventing fear of economic retaliation against employees who 
voiced grievances.80  Guided by that principle, the court found the discharge of the women to be 
retaliatory in nature and protected under § 215(a)(3).   
 The Eighth Circuit in Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha also protected an employee’s 
assertion of rights.81  The employee in that case protested what she believed to be the unlawful 
conduct of her employer.  The court found that her belief that the conduct was unlawful was 
reasonable, and that “her lawful assertion of rights based on that belief must be protected.”82  
This finding was based on the purpose of the Act, and the court did not engage in a parsing of the 
statute.  Instead, it simply found that not protecting the activity in this case would violate the 
                                                 
79 This particular aspect of Hagan is beyond the scope of this paper.  The employee in Hagan was a manager, which 
presents additional issues, as managers are often responsible for passing along the complaints and concerns of their 
subordinates to other supervisors.  Therefore, for a manager to be protected under § 215(a)(3), he or she must 
“somehow step out of his normal job role.”  Hagan, 529 F.3d at 627.  “In order to engage in protected activity under 
§ 215(a)(3), the employee must step outside his or her role of representing the company and either file (or threaten to 
file) an action adverse to the employer, actively assist other employees in asserting FLSA rights, or otherwise 
engage in activities that reasonably could be perceived as directed towards the assertion of rights protected by the 
FLSA.”  Id.   
80 EEOC v. White & Son Enter., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989). 
81 Maxey’s Yamaha, 513 F.2d at 181.   
82 Id. at 181. 
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purpose of the statute “of preventing employees’ attempts to secure their rights under the Act 
from taking on the character of ‘a calculated risk.’”83   
  c.  Comparing to Title VII  
 The Ninth Circuit engaged in detailed comparative analysis, rejecting the defendants’ 
argument that a comparison to Title VII urges the conclusion that Congress did not intend to 
include informal internal complaints in the FLSA’s provision.84  The court found that the breadth 
of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision could not dictate the appropriate construction of the 
FLSA’s provision.85  The FLSA was enacted in 1938, and Title VII was enacted in 1964.  The 
court noted that in 1938 “statutes were far shorter and less detailed, and were written in more 
general and simpler terms.”86  It was completely unpersuaded by the argument that “Congress’ 
choice of words in 1964 can resolve the meaning of words chosen in 1937.”87 
  d.  Avoiding Statutory Redundancy  
While definitions of “file” and “complaint” are often the bellwethers of a court’s holding 
on this issue, some courts find significance (and additional ambiguity) in the final part of the 
provision.  Section 215(a)(3) protects employees who file complaints “under or related to this 
chapter.”88  The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the anti-retaliation provision only 
applies to formal complaints filed with an employer because such a construction “would render 
the ‘or related to’ language superfluous.”89  Therefore, complaints “under” the FLSA are those 
                                                 
83 Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 293 (1960)).   
84 Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1005.  However, the court does go on to use cases interpreting the anti-retaliation provisions 
of other legislation to make its point, including the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act, the Federal Railroad Safety 
Act, and the Clean Water Act.  Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Id.  
88 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).   
89 Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1004.   
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filed in court and with the Department of Labor, and those that are “related to” the Act are those 
complaints filed with an employer and relating to the subject matter of the FLSA.90 
The First Circuit dismissed another argument with the reasoning that such a construction 
would create a redundancy.  While this paper focuses on the first type of protected activity, the 
filing of a complaint, the second type of protected activity is “institu[ing] or caus[ing] to be 
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter.”91  If the phrased “filed any complaint” 
was read to require a formal filing, the additional clause protecting the initiation of a proceeding 
becomes superfluous.92  The First Circuit, invoking a traditional canon of construction, found 
that for each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning, the phrase “file an complaint” 
must be read to protect informal complaints.93 
e.  Assertion of Rights as the Basic Test  
The Tenth Circuit, unlike many other circuits, engaged in no statutory analysis 
whatsoever.  In Love v. RE/MAX, the court found simply that the FLSA applies to the unofficial 
assertion of rights through complaints at work.94  In that case a female employee wrote a 
memorandum to the president of her company requesting a raise after learning that male 
employees in similar positions were given raises.95  Attached to her memo was a copy of the 
Equal Pay Act.96   Love was promptly fired.  Using, in part, the purpose of the FLSA for 
guidance, the court found her discharge retaliatory both under Title VII and the FLSA because 
                                                 
90 Id. at 1005. The First Circuit also found that a reading of “file” that requires formal external filings would make 
“under or related to” redundant.    
91 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3) (2006).   
92 Valerio v. Putnam Associates, Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 42 (1st Cir. 1999).   
93 Id. at 42.   
94 Love v. RE/MAX, 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984).  
95 Id. at 384.  
96 Id.  
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the immediate cause of the employee’s discharge was her unofficial assertion of rights to her 
employer.97   
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar holding in EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools.  
Citing Love v. RE/MAX, the court held that an assertion of statutory rights triggers protection 
under the provision, not just the filing of a formal complaint.  In that case, the employee, a 
school custodian, complained to the school district about her unequal pay and expressed her 
belief that they were “breaking some sort of law” by paying her lower wages than previously 
paid to male temporary custodians.98  Following her protests, she suffered adverse employment 
actions.  The court found that the plaintiff had effectively set forth a claim of retaliation because 
it is the assertion of rights that triggers the protection of § 215(a)(3), not the filing of a formal 
complaint.99 
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit in Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha began its analysis of the 
facts with the conclusion that “[t]he Act prohibits discrimination against an employee who 
asserts or threatens to assert his or her FLSA rights.”100  In Maxey’s an employee was fired for 
refusing to participate in what she believed to be an unlawful scheme following a Department of 
Labor investigation.  The court found that the employee’s “lawful assertion of rights based on 
that belief must be protected.”101  The employee’s termination was retaliatory in nature since she 
had asserted her rights on a good faith belief that her employer’s conduct was unlawful.  
Therefore, she should have been protected by § 215(a)(3).   
 
                                                 
97 “In this section, Congress ‘sought to foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the 
Act would be enhanced’ by recognizing that ‘fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved 
employees quietly to accept substandard conditions.’”  Id. at 387 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 
361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)).   
98 Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.3d at 989.   
99 Id. at 989–990.  
100 Maxey’s Yamaha, 513 F.2d at 180.  
101 Id. at 181.  
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III.  THE CASE FOR A BROAD CONSTRUCTION 
 Part III will analyze the various methods of construction discussed in Part II.  Part III.A 
begins with a brief explanation of how remedial statutes are generally approached.  Beginning 
with Part III.B, the remaining sections are structured in the order that courts typically turn to 
these methods of interpretation.   
A.  Remedial Statutes  
 The FLSA is remedial in nature, and as a result, should be liberally construed.  It is a 
general policy that remedial statutes are interpreted broadly to best achieve the purpose the 
statute was enacted for.102  A liberal construction can make a statute applicable in more 
situations than a strict construction might allow for.103  “A court may interpret a remedial statute 
to apply in circumstances not specifically considered by the legislature so long as those 
circumstances are within the ambit of the legislative purposes.”104   
                                                
Sometimes public values are employed as a justification for not using a strict statutory 
construction.  Public policy considerations, to the chagrin of some, exert a significant influence 
in the process of judicial statutory interpretation.105  When a public interest is affected, courts are 
likely to interpret a statute in a way that favors the public.106  Courts sometimes reject narrow 
constructions that “undermine the public policy sought to be served,”107 especially “where a 
narrow construction discourages rather than encourages the specific action the legislature has 
sought to foster and promulgate.”108 
 
 
102 2A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction §60:1 (7th ed. 2009, Norman Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 
eds.). 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at §60:2. 
105 Id. at §56:1. 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Sutherland, supra note 101, at §56:1. 
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B.  Plain Meaning  
When interpreting a statute, the first place to start is—of course—the statute itself.  Plain 
meaning is the default rule in statutory interpretation, and in most cases, the plain meaning of a 
statute will answer the question.109   
Proponents of a literal construction of § 215(a)(3) first argue that the plain meaning of the 
words “file any complaint” requires writing.110  The conclusion to this argument is based on the 
principle of expresio unius est exclusio alterius—by articulating three types of protected activity, 
the inclusion of a fourth unwritten activity is expressly prohibited by traditional canons of 
construction.  However, numerous circuit courts have made persuasive arguments that the plain 
meaning of the phrase “file any complaint” does not, in fact, require writing.  
American courts commonly use dictionaries to ascertain the “plain meaning” of statutory 
terms.111  Of course, there are multiple reputable dictionaries, and often there are multiple 
definitions for a word.  Additionally, the accepted definitions for words may change over 
time.112  The terms “file” and “complaint” have multiple possible meanings.113  Dictionary 
definitions appear with regularity in the opinions and briefs of cases interpreting § 215(a)(3).   
                                                
First, the verb, “to file.”  The First Circuit noted that “file” encompasses two types of 
actions.  The first is “‘to deliver (as a legal paper or instrument) after complying with any 
condition precedent (as the payment of a fee) to the proper officer for keeping on file or among 
 
109 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 223 (2000).   
110 The expression “plain meaning” refers to “meanings of a statutory text that are apparent from the text alone . . . 
without reference to external sources or interpretative aids.”  CHRISTIAN M. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
IN AMERICAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 12 (2002).   
111 See CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, supra note 109, at 15.   
112 The Supreme Court has held indicated a preference for the dictionary definition of a term at the time of 
enactment of the statute.  See, e.g. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42–45 (1979) (“A fundamental canon of 
construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning.  Therefore, we look to the ordinary meaning of the term ‘bribery’ at the time Congress enacted 
the statute in 1961.”).   
113 Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 17 as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (2008)(No. 08-2820). 
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the records of his office.’”114  The court did not entertain any idea that this definition of file 
supports a broad reading of the provision.  The second definition, however, the court found to be 
“sufficiently elastic to encompass” a broad construction.  This definition is “to place (as a paper 
or instrument) on file among the legal or official records of an office esp[ecially] by formally 
receiving, endorsing, and entering.”115   
The Ninth Circuit based its reasoning on contextual use of the term “file,” stating that 
“[g]iven the widespread use of the term ‘file’ to include the filing of complaints with employers, 
it is therefore reasonable to assume that Congress intended that the term be as used in § 215 
(a)(3) to include the filing of such complaints.”116 
Next, the noun, “complaint.”  The First Circuit again cited two definitions.  It found that 
“complaint” could be defined as “either ‘the act or action of expression protest, censure or 
resentment: expression of injustice’ . . . or as a formal allegation or charge against a party made 
or presented to the appropriate court or officer.’”117  Therefore, complaint has meaning both as a 
term of art in the legal system, and a general meaning.  The First Circuit also that Congress’s 
failure to specify that the complaint had to be made to a court or agency, “Congress left open the 
possibility that it intended ‘complaint’ to relate to less formal expressions of protest . . . 
conveyed to an employer.”118 
Despite the concise nature of the plain meaning analysis, it does not resolve the question.  
Using a plain meaning analysis, circuit courts have arrived at two very different conclusions.  
The Second and the Fourth circuits found that the plain meaning of the statute precludes the 
                                                 
114 Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41.   
115 Id. 
116 Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1004.   
117 Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41.   
118 Id.    
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protection of complaints made internally, to one’s employer.119  Yet other circuits, interpreting 
the same text, concluded that internal complaints are protected activity under the provision.120 
The above demonstrates the inadequacy of the textualist approach to statutory 
interpretation in this instance—“[w]hat the words of a statute say and what they mean are often 
entirely different.”121  The central problem with textualism is that statutory language can be 
ambiguous or vague.122  The varied meanings of the two words provide many possible 
interpretations.  The issue is that “the meaning of words (whether ‘plain’ or not) depends on both 
culture and context. Statutory terms are not self-defining, and words have no meaning before or 
without interpretation.”123   
An analysis focused solely on the meaning of the words “file any complaint” creates 
more questions than it answers.  When the plain meaning of a statute does not answer the 
question, courts turn to other sources for help.  Additionally, it is not unheard of for a court to 
come to a conclusion at odds with the plain meaning of a statute.124 
C.  Agency Interpretations  
 Since 1984, when the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,125 the role of agencies has increased.  If the text of a 
statute is ambiguous, courts look to relevant agency interpretations.126  If the agency 
                                                 
119 Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 55 (1993) (“The plain language of this provision limits the cause of 
action to retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or testifying, but does not encompass 
complaints made to a supervisor.”); Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (2000) (“[T]he statutory 
language clearly place limits on the range of retaliation proscribed by the Act.  [The FLSA] prohibits retaliation for 
testimony given or about to be given but not for an employee’s voicing of a position on working conditions in 
opposition to any employer.”). 
120 See supra footnote 34.   
121 Sutherland, supra note 101, at §56a:1. 
122 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 418 (1989).   
123 Id. at 416.   
124 See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).   
125 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
126 Id. at 842–43. 
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interpretations are permissible constructions of the statutory language, then those interpretations 
are given controlling effect.127  
 Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed an older standard as the “deference standard for 
most administrative interpretations” when statutes are ambiguous.128  Skidmore v. Swift & Co.129 
was a FLSA dispute over the “on call” time of fire-fighting employees at a plant, and the issue 
was whether their “on call” time was compensable.  A Department of Labor Administrator 
issued informal rulings, in the form of an opinion letter, advocating a case-by-case approach to 
such cases.  The lower courts did not defer to the Administrator’s interpretation, and instead 
found that the on call time was not compensable, working time.130   
When the Supreme Court heard the case, it remanded it to the lower court, and issued a 
standard by which such cases should be decided.  The Court said that an agency’s interpretations 
would be given deference according to the persuasiveness of the interpretation.  That 
determination will be based on four factors—“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”131  Skidmore deference 
applies to less formal modes of adjudication and rulemaking, while Chevron deference is still 
applied to formal agency adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking.132   
 The Secretary of Labor, as amicus in Kasten, argued that the Department of Labor’s 
construction of § 215(a)(3) was entitled to Skidmore deference because it was a reasonable 
                                                 
127 Id.  
128 Kristen E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1235, 1245 (2007).  See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–33 (2001); Christensen v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).   
129 323 U.S. 134 (1944).   
130 Kristen E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, supra note 127, at 1240.   
131 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.   
132 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.   
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interpretation.133  The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, because it found that the 
Secretary’s interpretation of the provision was a litigating position, not a “Department of Labor 
regulation, ruling, or administrative practice.”134  The court relied on a 1996 Supreme Court 
decision, Smiley v. Citibank.135  It is true that Chevron does not require deference to agency 
litigating positions.136  This is partly “because the agency is not exercising delegating authority 
when it takes litigating positions and in part because of the fairness concerns that the agency as 
advocate will not develop interpretations solely through the use of neutral expertise.”137 
 The Secretary of Labor is authorized to administer the FLSA.138  Through the Wage and 
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, the Secretary investigates employment practices to 
determine FLSA violations.139  “[T]he Secretary of Labor has consistently interpreted the phrase 
‘file any complaint’ to include protection for employees who orally complain to their 
employers.”140  The Secretary argued that this is demonstrated by the enforcement actions the 
Department of Labor takes on behalf of employees.141  This interpretation is more than a 
litigating position—it is a repeated administrative practice.   
 While the Secretary’s position is not controlling, it should certainly be considered by 
courts for guidance when construing the anti-retaliation provision.  In Skidmore, the lower courts 
did not take into account an interpretation of several FLSA provisions from the Administrator of 
                                                 
133 Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 13 as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (2008)(No. 08-2820) (“The Secretary’s consistent, reasonable 
interpretation of section 15(a)(3) is entitled to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. . . . because it reflects the 
agency’s fair and considered judgment.”). 
134 Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839, footnote 2.   
135 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996). That case relied on Chevron deference, and does not reflect the revived Skidmore 
standard for less formal agency interpretations.  The Secretary of Labor in Kasten urged that the court use Skidmore 
deference, reflecting a shift in deferential standards since Mead and Christensen. 
136  Eskridge, supra note 108, at 321–22.   
137 Id. at 322.   
138 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006).   
139 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (2006).   
140 Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 15 as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (2008)(No. 08-2820). 
141 Id. at 15.   
 24
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.142  The Supreme Court ruled that it the 
interpretations were entitled to “respect” and it was reversible error not to take them into 
account.143  Agency rulings, interpretations, and opinions “constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgments to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”144  The 
Secretary’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision, as demonstrated in its amicus briefs is 
consistent and thorough.  The court in Kasten did not evaluate the Secretary’s interpretation for 
indications of validity or persuasiveness.   
D.  Legislative History 
 When there is ambiguity in a statute, legislative history is often used to guide 
interpretation and shed light on possible meanings or purposes.  While the purpose of the FLSA 
generally is well known, there is a lacuna of legislative history concerning Congress’s intent for 
the scope of § 215(a)(3).  “The provision was not the subject of congressional debate or 
explained in the relevant reports.”145  There was one general statement made that the provision 
makes it unlawful “to do certain acts which violate provisions of the Act or obstruct its 
administration.”146  Legislative history is a tool that is essentially unavailable to those 
interpreting the anti-retaliation provision.   
E. Canons of Construction  
 The canons of construction or interpretation are a “hazily defined bunch of rules, 
maxims, or homilies that courts can invoke to resolve interpretative problems.”147  Although the 
                                                 
142 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136, 140 (1944). 
143 Id. at 140.   
144 Id.  
145 Informal Brief for the Secretary of Labor at footnote 2 as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Jafari v. 
Old Dominion Transit Mgmt. Co., 2008 WL 5102010 (2009) (No. 09-1004).  
146 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 75-2738, 33 (1938).   
147 CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, supra note 109, at 25.   
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traditional canons of construction may be prone to manipulation,148 they are still often used and 
cited to.  Part III will analyze the thematic arguments discussed in Part II and compare them to 
the accepted or common canons of construction.  “[S]tatutory construction is an exercise of 
practical reason, in which text, history, and purpose interact with background understandings in 
the legal culture.”149 
 1. Comparison to Other Statutes  
As detailed above, many courts compare the language of the retaliatory provision of Title 
VII to the equivalent provision in the FLSA.150  Similar statutes are often an extrinsic source 
used in statutory interpretation.  In this approach to statutory interpretation, the courts 
“compare[] the wording of comparable statutory provisions elsewhere . . . The conclusions to be 
drawn from such comparisons are either that the provision at issue means the same thing as the 
other provision, or that the provision at issue cannot mean the same thing as the other 
provision.”151 
One similar approach to statutory interpretation is called the doctrine of in pari materia.  
Statutes are “in pari material when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of 
persons or things, or which have the same purpose or object.”152  Similar statutes should be 
interpreted similarly.  The two anti-retaliation provisions, while they may serve similar purposes 
of discouraging retaliation, are arguably not in para materia.153  The purpose of Title VII 
                                                 
148 See, e.g. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about how 
Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).   
149 Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 121, at 498.   
150 See supra Part II.B.1.b and Part II.B.2.c (discussing courts that mention Title VII in their analyses of the § 
215(a)(3)). 
151 CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, supra note 109, at 14.   
152 Sutherland, supra note 101, at §51:3. 
153 For an example of a court finding two statutes to be in para material, see Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 
750, 756 (1979).  The Court used Title VII to guide an interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
finding that “[s]ince the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose . . . we may properly conclude that Congress 
intended that the construction of § 14(b) [of the ADEA] should follow that of § 706(c) [of Title VII].”  Id.  
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generally is to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, and the purpose of the FLSA is to 
regulate working hours and wages.   
Even when statutes are not found to be in pari materia, “construing statutes by reference 
to others advances [the] values of harmony and consistency.”154  An ambiguous statute may be 
construed using the language of other statutes “which are not particularly related, but which 
apply to similar persons, things, or relationships.”155  Of course, there are limitations to this tool 
of statutory interpretation.  “The interpretation of one statute by reference to an analogous but 
unrelated statute is considered an unreliable means to discern legislative intent.”156   
The Second Circuit, in its resolute holding that informal complaints are not protected, 
used Title VII for comparison. 157    The court found meaning in the fact that the FLSA provision 
has expressly enumerated types of conduct, in contrast to the broader language of the Title VII 
provision. The Seventh Circuit confirmed the conclusion it reached that oral complaints are not 
protected activity by noting that “Congress could have, but did not, use broader language in the 
FLSA’s retaliation provision.”158  It cited Title VII’s retaliation provision as evidence of a case 
when Congress did chose broader language, and decided that there must be significance in the 
fact that Congress chose more narrow language for the FLSA. 
Though the statutes are not in para materia, some courts continue to rely on comparison 
to Title VII as a definitive construction of the statute.  This is a misguided use of this method of 
statutory interpretation.  While an analogy to Title VII could certainly guide the analysis, it 
                                                 
154 Id.   
155 Id. at §53:3. 
156 Id. at §53:5. Though interpretation by analogy is an unreliable tool for interpretation, it is worth noting that there 
are many statutes that can be used as analogies for the protection of internal and informal complaints.  See, e.g., 
Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478 (3d Cir. 1993) (protecting employees who 
complain to their employer even though the statute did not expressly cover internal complaints). 
157 Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993).  See supra Part II.B.1.b for a discussion of Judge 
Suhrheinrich’s dissenting opinion in EEOC v. Romeo Community Sch. 
158Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009) Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009), cert granted (U.S. March 22, 2010) (No. 08-2820).      
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should not be the dispositive factor in the interpretation of § 215(a)(3).  The Ninth Circuit, as 
addressed above,159 rejected the argument that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII should 
be used as a tool for interpreting the FLSA.160  Given the decades that passed between the 
enacting of each statute, the comparison is a weak one, and does not enlighten the analysis the 
way the proponents of this argument suggest it does. 
 2.  Avoiding Statutory Redundancy 
It is a traditional canon of construction that every term in a statute must be given effect, 
so that nothing in the statute is surplusage.161  Part II.B.2.d discussed those courts that construed 
“filed any complaint” liberally because to read it otherwise would render parts of the provision 
redundant.  It is a common canon of interpretation that “one part of a statute may not be 
construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.”162 
The First Circuit reasoned, “courts may ‘assume that Congress used two terms because it 
intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.’”163  In the case of the FLSA’s 
anti-retaliation provision, this means that “filed any complaint” cannot mean a formal filing with 
a court or government agency.  If it did, then the additional language “instituted or caused to be 
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter” would be meaningless and 
unnecessary.  If there is an alternative way of construing a provision that does not render another 
part of it meaningless, that is the interpretation that should be applied.   
 
                                                 
159 See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
160 Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 1999).   
161 See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How 
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 404 (1950) (“Every word and clause must be given effect.” 
(citing Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws § 60 (2d ed. 1911) and 
John Lewis, J. G. Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 380 (2d ed. 1904)).   
162 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 164 (2009).   
163 Valerio v. Putnam Associates, 173 F.3d 35, 42 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 
146 (1995).   
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 3.  Legislative Intent  
Courts may also use the intent of a statute as a tool for construing it.164  “A plain meaning 
can be overcome by compelling evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”165  Courts may 
interpret a statute in a way that extends or restricts the language of the statute “by noting that ‘the 
spirit of a statute governs the letter.”166  “Where the purposes of a statute can be achieved only 
by extending the operation of its language to its most inclusive meaning, even beyond its 
common meaning, courts will do so.”167  An extended interpretation may be used when a “statute 
is ambiguous or capable of a range of literal meanings”168 or when “another interpretation would 
make for absurdity or injustice.”169  The Supreme Court has used this approach.170  This theory 
“renders statutory interpretation adaptable to new circumstances.”171 
 So what is the spirit of this statute that should be kept in mind when construing it?  The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the FLSA as to achieve certain minimum labor 
standards for covered employees. 172  To achieve compliance, Congress “sought to foster a 
climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced.”173  
The Supreme Court has “made clear that the key to interpreting the anti-retaliation provision is 
the need to prevent employees’ ‘fear of economic retaliation” for voicing grievances about 
substandard conditions.”174  The retaliation provisions are “remedial and humanitarian in 
                                                 
164 Sutherland, supra note 101, at § 54:3. 
165 Eskridge, supra note 108, at 224 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982)).   
166 Sutherland, supra note 101, at § 54:3 (citing Taylor v. U.S., 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1907)).   
167 Id. at  §54:4. 
168 Id. at §54:5. 
169 Id. 
170 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (relying on Congress’s general intent or purpose in 
enacting Title VII to allow affirmative action).   
171 Eskridge, supra note 108, at 221.   
172 Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). 
173 Id. 
174 Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124 (3rd Cir. 1987).   
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purpose.”175  Following the spirit of the statute, an extended interpretation of the literal terms 
should be applied. “[A]s the FLSA was designed to encourage employees to report their 
employer’s violations, the amount of protection afforded will directly affect the ultimate success 
of this design.”176 
Extended interpretations that are guided by the spirit of the statute are appropriate when 
the “statute is ambiguous or capable of a range of literal meanings.”177 The terms of the anti-
retaliation provision are ambiguous, and the phrase “file any complaint” is subject to several 
varied interpretations.  Much of this paper has focused on the various sources of ambiguity and 
confusion of § 215(a)(3).  Courts time and time again have written on the varied meanings that 
can be imputed from the phrase “file any complaint.”  An extended interpretation is suitable to 
achieve the purpose of § 215(a)(3)—to foster an environment in which employees are able to 
voice grievances about working conditions without fear.  To successfully create such an 
environment, and achieve the purpose of the provision, it is imperative that the distinction 
between oral and written complaints be abandoned.   
One canon of construction also allows for reliance on the spirit of the statute when 
“another interpretation would make for absurdity or injustice.”178  The facts of the Kasten case 
demonstrate the injustice that can result when oral complaints are distinguished from written 
complaints and not protected.179  Elevating form over substance to this degree is absurd.  The 
provision is intended to make employees feel secure enough to come forward with grievances 
about working standards.  Mr. Kasten followed the grievance procedure articulated by his 
employer, and complained about a legitimate wage and hour violation.  The adverse employment 
 
175 Id.   
176 Jennifer Clemons, supra note 21, at 535.     
177 Sutherland, supra note 101, at §54:5. 
178 Id. 
179 See supra Part I.A. (explaining the facts of the Kasten case).   
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actions taken against Mr. Kasten will no doubt discourage his former co-workers from coming 
forward with complaints.  This decision is directly contrary to the purpose of the anti-retaliation 
provision.   
The absurdity is especially clear for employees in industries who most commonly 
communicate with their supervisors orally.  Employees with complaints may hesitate to 
communicate those complaints in written form for fear that the gesture may, ironically, instigate 
repudiation where an informal complaint might not. The Secretary of Labor has offered an 
illustrative example of the outcome of this distinction: “[A]n employee who telephones the 
human resources department asserting FLSA rights could be subject to discharge without 
receiving the protection of section 15 (a)(3), while an employee who raises the same issue in 
writing would be protected.”180  It is unjust to not protect employees who make valid, sufficient 
complaints.181  The distinction between oral and written complaints creates an illogical system, 
and nothing in the statute suggests that such a distinction was intended.   
IV.  PROPOSAL 
 No single method of statutory interpretation controls.  Attorneys arguing for a certain 
interpretation of a statute should take a cumulative approach, “taking the most convincing pieces 
of whatever approaches best fit their side of the case.”182  This author supports an interpretation 
of the anti-retaliation provision that is a more dynamic approach than a plain meaning approach.  
There a number of different conventional ways the terms “file” and “complaint” are used.  As 
Eskridge wrote, discussing the same conundrum of various definitions the Supreme Court faced 
 
180 Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 18 as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (2008)(No. 08-2820). 
181 See infra Part IV for a suggestion on what constitutes valid, sufficient complaints.  
182 Eskridge, supra note 108, at 9.  
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in United Steelworkers v. Weber and Holy Trinity Church, “Upon what basis can we say that one 
of them is morally more natural than the others?”183 
  “File” and “complaint” should be interpreted in light of the purposes the provision was 
intended to serve.  When assessing an employee’s activity, courts should engage in a somewhat 
fact intensive analysis.  In the circuits with more liberal standards, the test is often phrased as the 
assertion of statutory rights.184  What factors should be considered in determining if an 
employee’s conduct is an assertion of statutory rights?   
 Courts should protect communications that are assertions of statutory rights, but there are 
limitations on the activities that should be protected as informal, internal complaints.  A 
complaint must be specific enough to inform the employer of the alleged violation.  The First 
Circuit, holding that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who has filed a 
sufficient complaint with an employer, also recognized the need for boundaries on the protection 
afforded employees— 
[N]ot all abstract grumblings will suffice to constitute the filing of a complaint 
with one’s employer . . . “[T]here is a point at which an employee’s concerns and 
comments are too generalized and informal to constitute complaints that are filed 
with an employer within the meaning of the [statute].”185 
 
While a specific statute need not be named, it would be appropriate to require an employee to 
specifically mention the activity that he or she believed to be unlawful.   
 
183 Id. at 238.   
184 See, e.g., EEOC v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff had 
effectively set forth a claim of retaliation because adverse employment actions followed her protests that her 
employers were “breaking some sort of law.”); EEOC v. White & Sons. Enter., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 
1989) ([T]he unofficial complaints expressed by the women to their employer about unequal pay constitute an 
assertion of rights protected under the statute.  The FLSA is remedial in nature.”); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 
121, 124 (3rd Cir. 1987) (finding the FLSA “protect[s] employees who have protested Fair Labor Standards Act 
violations to their employers.”); Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 180 (8th Cir. 1975) (“The Act 
prohibits discrimination against an employee who asserts or threatens to assert his or her FLSA rights.”). 
185 Valerio v. Putnam Associates Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 44 (1999) (third alteration in original) (quoting Clean Harbors 
Environmental Services, Inc. v. Herman 146 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 1998).   
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Courts should not require that employees mention the statute by name.  A common theme 
in these cases is employees who express their belief that their employers’ conduct is illegal.  
They may not know what statute grants them rights.  Requiring such knowledge of employees is 
unfair and burdensome.  It is not unfair, however, to continue to look for language from 
employees reflecting a good faith belief that the employer’s conduct is illegal.  These 
requirements distinguish an assertion of rights from an ordinary complaint.  For example, a 
complaint about an overtime policy that did not include any notion that the employee believed 
the policy unlawful may not come under the provision.   
The following are examples of complaints that meet these criteria, modeled after 
employees’ activities in real cases.  First, an employee who tells human resources personnel “I 
believe the location of the time clocks is illegal.”186  Second, an employee who tells her 
employer “You are breaking some sort of law by paying me lower wages than the men.”187  
These types of complaints express a belief in the illegality of the conduct, and mention specific 
practices. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics escaped from a directive intended to prohibit its 
conduct.  When interpreting the anti-retaliation provision, courts should be mindful of the 
purpose § 215(a)(3) and the FLSA generally.  When the Supreme Court hears the Kasten case, it 
is this author’s hope that the Court protects oral complaints.  If the Court does not, Congress 
should act to protect what can only be described as the most socially responsible behavior—
employees attempting to hold their employers to the standards Congress has chosen to hold them 
to.  This holding is not anti-employer, but supports law-abiding employers.  A literal reading of 
 
186 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, No, 08-2820 (7th Cir. Oct. 6, 
2008). 
187 See EEOC v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992).   
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“file any complaint” with restrictive definitions of the phrase creates redundancies in the statute 
and is not cohesive with the goal of the statute.  It allows for a misinterpretation to create the 
exact injustice that §215(a)(3) was intended to eliminate. 
